Howard Chan, Kurv Investment Management
Why the Real AI Bottleneck Isn't Compute
Howard Chan was on this show two years ago, almost to the week. At the time his firm had one fund and a theory about running institutional options strategies inside an ETF wrapper. He came back with two more years of history and a new fund built on a claim worth arguing with. The binding constraint in the AI buildout has already moved, and most of the market is still pricing the old one.
The Bottleneck Moved
For four or five years the story was compute. Everyone bought Nvidia because the models needed calculation and calculation was scarce. Howard's team went looking for what breaks next, on the theory that if you push any digital process far enough you run into something physical. What they landed on was memory.
His explanation for why has nothing to do with chip specifications, which is what makes it useful. A couple of years ago a New York Times reporter talked to a chatbot for an hour or two and it eventually told him it was in love with him. That was a hallucination, and the reason it happened is that the model had no record of the earlier questions. Every prompt arrived as if it were the first one. The fix was not a better model. The fix was more memory, so the thing can hold a conversation the way a person holds a conversation. The same requirement shows up on Nvidia's own boards, and again in every server going into a data center.
Other tech guests on this show keep reaching for picks and shovels. Howard rejects the phrase. Memory is not the picks and shovels of the AI trade. It is the mine.
Three Companies
Three companies make 90 percent of the world's memory chips: Micron, Samsung's memory division, and SK Hynix. That number carries the whole thesis. Before the buildout memory was a commodity with no differentiation, which is why Micron kept losing share to Korean manufacturers who could undercut it. Commodity business goes to whoever is cheapest.
High bandwidth memory changed the shape of that. Stacking memory to get more capacity into the same footprint turned a commodity into something specialized, and specialized products carry a moat that commodities never have. By Howard's account the three of them have sold out most of their inventory through 2028, and SK Hynix just reported revenue up 250 percent with profit up 500 percent. Manufacturers that spent two decades as price takers are setting prices.
The obvious objection is that high prices bring supply. His answer is that supply cannot respond quickly here. A new fabrication plant costs 30 to 50 billion dollars and takes years of construction and hiring before it produces anything. Then you have to equip it, and the lithography machines come from one company in the Netherlands with a waitlist already measured in years. Stack those together and you get his two to four year window, which is why he does not read the recent correction in semiconductors as the end of the story.
Where This Reaches a Client Portfolio
There is a second order effect. Apple raised prices on MacBooks and iPhones, and Xbox prices went up too. The input driving it is memory cost. And because the three manufacturers would rather build the high margin specialized chips, they are crowding out their own production of the ordinary kind, which pushes a shortage into everything else that needs memory.
Howard's precedent is the COVID car market. Prices rose and most people blamed a metals shortage. The binding constraint was memory chips, because a car is a computer on wheels. If that pattern repeats, memory stops being a semiconductor story and becomes a cost input across consumer goods.
What Would Change His Mind
Asked what data would break the thesis, Howard gave an answer specific enough to act on. Hyperscaler capital spending is the first input. When Google announces higher spending, that is cash leaving one balance sheet and arriving on the memory makers' books. The second is the backlog. Added supply or slower hyperscaler demand compresses the backlog before it ever touches pricing power, which makes the backlog the early signal rather than the price.
The third is new entrants, and that one has history behind it. Undercutting the incumbent is how Korean manufacturers took the commodity business from Micron in the first place. A Chinese entrant arrived recently and got blamed for part of the pullback, but Howard's read is that it priced level with the Korean producers instead of underneath them. That is not what a supply break looks like.
He flagged a risk running the other direction too. Robotics needs memory. If hyperscaler spending flattens, that demand can take up the slack.
Concentration on Purpose
The new fund carries roughly 85 percent of its weight in those three names. The word select in the name is how the firm signals concentration, and the intent was to own the manufacturers rather than the buyers, since plenty of products already hand you the hyperscalers. As prices have moved he has added other names, including SanDisk, and he is clear that memory is not one product. NAND, solid state and storage are separate businesses feeding separate parts of the same buildout.
The execution detail is the part that does not show up on a fact sheet. SK Hynix has an American depositary receipt, and it has been trading at a 25 to 30 percent premium to the Korean listing. Howard's team buys the Korean security instead. Getting there is not simple, because the Korean equity market is largely restricted to registered institutional investors, and securing that access is what held up the launch. Two funds can hold the same company and pay very different prices for it.
Two Years on the First Fund
The original fund holds mega cap technology and writes options against it for income. The problem he set out to solve is that most option income strategies lag the thing they hold, because selling calls means selling upside. His answer is to write selectively rather than mechanically, and to write on single names rather than on the index, since a basket of single name writes harvests more premium than one diversified index write.
The example makes the logic concrete. Netflix has been falling since it announced its bid for Warner Brothers, which makes it a name where you can collect the full premium without the stock running through the strike. Writing calls on the semiconductor names in that same portfolio this year would have capped the upside that actually paid. Doing it that way requires a view on every holding, which is the real line between an active manager and a mechanical overlay.
On placement he treats it as a complement to a dividend equity sleeve rather than a competitor. Dividend strategies buy high payers, high payers tend to be the slowest growers, and a book built that way sits out the sector where the growth has been. Pairing the two pulls combined sector exposure closer to the broad index. The memory fund gets different treatment. It is thematic, and he says it should come out of the growth allocation rather than the core.
Key Takeaways
- Howard's case is that the binding constraint in the AI buildout moved from compute to memory. Models need memory to hold context, and so do Nvidia's boards and every server going into a data center.
- Three companies make 90 percent of the world's memory chips and have sold out most of their inventory through 2028. High bandwidth memory turned a part that competed only on price into a specialized product with a moat.
- The supply response is slow by physics rather than by choice. A fabrication plant runs 30 to 50 billion dollars and years of construction, and the lithography equipment has a single supplier with a multi year waitlist, which is the basis for a two to four year view instead of a quarterly one.
- The signals that would break the thesis are hyperscaler capital spending, the order backlog, and new entrants pricing under the incumbents. The recent Chinese entrant priced level with the Korean producers rather than underneath them.
- Memory cost is already in the price of phones, laptops and consoles, and the manufacturers are crowding out their own commodity production. The COVID car market is his template for how a chip shortage reaches the broader economy.
- On the options side he writes selectively on single names instead of mechanically across an index. A name falling on its own news lets you collect the full premium, while a name in a live upside move should not be capped.
Listen to the full conversation on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or YouTube.
Full Transcript
5,266 wordsMachine transcribed from Brad Roth's conversation with Howard Chan, Kurv Investment Management, with speakers identified automatically. Timestamps link to that moment on YouTube. Lightly cleaned, otherwise unedited.
Welcome to Behind the Ticker, the podcast where we go beyond the symbol and into the strategy. I'm Brad Roth, founder and chief investment officer at Thor Funds. And in each episode, I sit down with ETF managers, CIOs, and industry leaders to break down how these funds are actually built, how they behave in real markets, and how advisors use them in real portfolios. Most people just see a ticker symbol, but we know much more goes on behind the ticker. Hey, Howard, welcome back to the show.
Thank you. Thank you for having me back.
So for anyone who maybe missed our first conversation, can you give everybody a quick version of your background? I know from our last recording, you were MIT engineering, Goldman Sachs, led an ETF business in PIMCO, and then founded Kurv. Can you just walk us through that journey
A little bit? Yeah. Where we are at Kurv is very much trying to find a solution to a problem. We were running a lot of institutional strategies for sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, and endowments. And a lot of these strategies, sophisticated institutional strategies, were really not available to people who have a brokerage account. So the idea for Kurv was very much, how do we wrap these strategies that have actually generated quite a bit of performance for a lot of these endowment and pension funds type investors, and then make it available for anybody who has a brokerage account. So that's the genesis of Kurv.
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And when we actually came on this channel two years ago, exactly two years, because we're celebrating the second anniversary of KQQ, that was our very first basket idea in a particular sector. And so now I'm happy to report, I think when we were first on, we were talking about a theory, financial, like how we would work. And now we have two years of history that performance that I've actually proven out those theories that we have been managing, applying the same techniques we have with these large institutional clients to an ETF.
Yeah. So I was going to say, since we last spoke, you guys have grown a lot. You've got new funds, new strategies. Can you kind of just give me the overall state of the firm today and kind of what you're focused on at the moment?
Yeah, we pretty much stuck to our core and try to maybe think about it like a tech company where what is the problem? What is the use case and how can we resolve it? A lot of myself have a background in asset allocation. A lot of team members came from PIMCO and other large asset managers. And we, through our careers, have seen a lot of trade-offs that investors and advisors have to make. And we try to make solutions for that. One of the biggest challenges, and especially now, is this trade-off that investors have to have between growth and income. So, this is even worse. now almost a decade before when we were in a zero rate environment where people were not expecting any yield from fixed income. And unfortunately, I think in the environment
That we're in, more and more people are needing to depend on investment income, whether approaching retirement or during retirement to offset either negative cash flow or just simply, needing more from beyond what they have in paycheck. And so, yeah. Oh, please go ahead. No, please. And there are lots of assets that you want to own, but don't generate income, right? So, for example, growth stocks, which has been larger and larger part of indices. We've talked about that in people's portfolios, but it's kind of an exposure you can't escape, right? That's where, if you look at the S&P 500, it's really the tech companies who have positive earnings versus more traditional consumer staples. They're actually relatively flat as a performance or actually slightly negative, right? But the problem is, is that growth stocks don't distribute dividends.
They, because of their return of investment is so high, they rather, either reinvest it back into the company or they do stock buyback. Or there are other asset classes, which we have moved now, like, where, so precious metals like gold and silver, right? Bonds, as we know, is less and less good of a hedge in a portfolio because that negative correlation between equities and bonds is, less negative. So other assets that are highly, more negatively correlated with equities are providing better hedges in a portfolio, but there also precious metals do not provide income. So we're really trying to figure out ways in where these are really anchors in people's portfolios that we think you should have going forward. And how do you build an income portfolio out of
That? Interesting. So let's just get right into your newest fund. It's, I'm going to call it KMEM, K-M-E-M, the Kurv Memory Select ETF. You guys launched this recently on July 1st at a high level. What is this fund? And as you, alluded to earlier, what problem are you trying to solve here?
Yeah. So at, unless you're sitting on a cave in Mars, this AI build out has been in the news for not just the last year, but the last four or five years, right? And initially the problem was compute. everybody was going after NVIDIA because these models requires amount, huge amounts of calculation. That was the original bottleneck. And what we did was we tried to see where are the bottlenecks that are coming next? Because if we, somebody on our team says, if you take an extreme scenario, right, if all of human knowledge, which is not true, can be encapsulated in ones and zeros, like what, what would you need? You actually need natural resources and physical, there's physical constraints and things, right? So we, we as investors
Tend to look a little bit forward and see what are the next bottleneck? And I don't know if you recall, there were a couple of years ago, there was like this article on the New York Times where a reporter started talking to chat GPT and he kept, he talked to, to the model for like an hour or two. And it went to very weird places where it, I think at the end, confessed love to him, something like that. And that was a common effect called a hallucination. And the reason is because when you ask the model a question, it doesn't remember the previous question that you asked. So there has no context. It's asked, it's answering your question as it was like a new question every time. And
Fortunately, we, I think most of the models have left this hallucinated stage, but the reason why they're able to fix this problem is because they have actually put in more memory into the, uh, into the models so that the models are able to retain past histories of your conversation. So just like you're talking to a friend, you have history, so it can better answer your question over time. And that is made possible because, um, of memory chips. And in fact, it's not just the models. It's even NVIDIA's motherboard requires more, uh, memories to be accessed in order to actually help the compute as well, uh, as well as, um, all of these, um, data centers are being built. Uh, they require a service requires a lot of memory. So this is what we feel was, a really big
Bottleneck in the AI built out. And so that's why we launched, uh, KMEM as a dedicated focus, uh, uh, uh, an investment case for that particular segment.
Yeah. So we've had a lot of tech focused ETFs on the show recently. And the phrase I keep hearing over and over again is the picks and shovels, but you really referred to KMEM as the mines instead of the picks and shovels. So of the AI trade. So can you walk us through that framing and why memory chips specifically sit at the heart of any AI build out right now?
Yeah. The reason is because there's a limited supply. And if you know about gold, silver, and copper, we also have this issue where we have limited mines, where we can get stuff out of the ground. Uh, and the reason is this is that, uh, most people don't know that 90% of the memory chips in the world is actually made by three companies. Uh, the first one is Micron. Uh, the second is a division of Samsung and the third is a SK Heinex, another Korean company. And so, um, they make most of the memory chips, uh, because before this built out memory chips was actually fairly commoditized. There's no differentiation. Uh, Micron has been around a lot, but a lot of the, their market share was taken by Korean companies, Samsung and high SK Heinex because what they were making is so
Commoditized that somebody who comes in with a lower price can undercut the volume that they were selling. Uh, but with the AI built out, actually, um, they're actually creating a moat around their business. They're creating these specialized chips called HBMs, which is specifically their, their memory is essentially stacked on top of each other's that gives more capacity to the AI build out. So they have actually going back to the mine analogy, they have sold out most of their inventories up to 2028. Uh, so, people's like, well, if their demand is so big, why don't you just make more? Right. Uh, but the, the problem is, is that this is the physical constraint I was mentioning about. You hit a physical limit in order to make more chips. You need more fabs,
Fabrications, uh, uh, factories, uh, they take, 30 to 50 billion of fabricate, a facility to build out. Right. And they take time, physical labor to build out, the factories, et cetera. And then there's additional bottlenecks. Okay. Now you have the factories that's in place, but you need the equipment to make these chips, right? So a lot of these use very, uh, high end technology, like the lithography, which another bottleneck is only one company in the world, uh, that makes that as an ASML, a Dutch company, and they already have years of, uh, back, uh, wait list to get their equipment. So all of these really distinct bottlenecks makes it impossible to increase, uh, supply, at least in the near term. We actually think this
Bottleneck is a two to four year thesis. That's why even, I think the elephant in the rooms, like we've had a good, big correction in semiconductors. Why is this still interesting? Is that because this constraint is going out two to four years, um, we see this actually continue to be an investment case. The reason is because you've actually seen that these, uh, memory companies who used to make commoditized products actually have pricing power. So SK Hynix just reported earnings. Their revenue went up 250% and their profit went up 500%. So they are price setters instead of price takers before into the market, right? Of course, there's other incumbencies that are coming in, uh, Chinese company, which what I think caused a little bit of the pullback, but
How they're setting the prices for their chip is at the same level as the Korean company. So it's not a cheaper alternative, uh, that people thought it was going to be. But I also want to mention, there's a secondary effect. So I'm sure everybody's heard of, Apple raising prices for their products, uh, MacBooks, iPhones, Xbox raised prices. Uh, all of these consumer products are raising prices because memory chips costs has gone up. There's a secondary effect, which is that because these three companies, Samsung, SK Hynix, Micron want to build a memory chip that has the moat, it's actually crowding out them making out commoditized memory chips. So there is another bottleneck in just consumer electronics, uh, in terms of all of these productions. So I think this
Actually has implications for many parts of the portfolio. Um, so we, we think this actually is a very interesting space for people to continue to look at despite, we actually think that the pullback is actually a good entry point into this particular space.
Well, Howard, you just, um, put about 50 different questions in my head. You and I could talk for probably two and a half hours on this. Let's try to boil down on a couple of things you just said there. Um, one of the things you just said was you think that this bottleneck could last, a couple of years, right? Three, four years. What data points are you guys looking at internally that would change that view? Like what would, what would make you say, okay, um, is it just pure supply? Is it, what would make you change that view or what would signal to you, um, that the supply is starting to broaden and we could see, we could see advancement and growth in this area
Instead of a constraint? Yeah. We, there's always risks and investments. So there's a few things that we, we look about. So obviously the first thing is the CapEx, uh, for hyperscalers, right? Uh, in fact, it's very indicative of, whenever there's an announcement or earnings call, which we just went through for Google, et cetera, they said they've increased their CapEx. That's actually good for memory companies because what they have cash outflows to spend is cash inflows for the, these memory chip companies. Um, I do think that, one, one thing is, um, we, we need to look at how much they're spending in terms of building out these capacities, but it, it's not a risk. It's not a fear case. It's how much
Of the backlog are they going to be able to resolve? Because many of these memory chips, again, as I've mentioned, has already two year, three year, uh, uh, backlog on, on orders. And then if you look at the hyperscalers, when they say they have another two, three years of compute backlog for people who want to use this, right? So there is this chain effect that, ultimately, um, uh, happened. So we think that if there is increased supply or slower demand from the hyperscaler, it's just going to compress the backlog, but they're still going to have pricing power. Uh, uh, the other thing that we are monitoring also is new entrance in the space.
There is a behavior in semiconductors where in the past, uh, we've seen this in the nineties and two thousands where, semiconductors chips become really hot. A lot of new entrance come in underpriced existing incumbent. And in fact, that's what a lot of the Korean companies did to Micron. Micron was like the incumbent in memory chips. And then, uh, most of memory chip production moved to Asia because they were actually able to produce it, uh, at a lower cost, uh, and undercut it, uh, because it was a commoditized product. Right. But I think in this cycle is a little bit different because we've seen a bifurcation in the market. There are large capable companies, the three companies who have the capital to focus on the specialized chips. And that's very much
Dependent on the hyperscalers and their spend. And then they're, they're moving out of the, the commoditized product, but there's still a bottleneck there. So really what we're looking at is a new entrance and also in the commoditized space, uh, because that feeds into everything we do. And I, another example is, I don't know if you people recall during COVID car prices went up, not because there wasn't enough metals to make, but because there were not enough memory chips in the cars to actually make what, cars are really just like computers on wheels nowadays. Right. So, um, so those things will filter out actually to more of the broader economy.
So that's another thing that we take a look at. And, and, and we think there's probably still going to be the cycle and semiconductors, but the, the peak and the trough are flattened a little bit more because just because there's more products and, and, the need is so much greater. There's, there's also upside risk. the next hottest thing is sort of robotics, right? How do we automate those also requirement? So there, there could be competing demands, offsetting those of the hyperscaler. So I would just say that there, there are risks definitely, but the space is so dynamic right now. I think we're kind of in this innovation push, uh, the 1900s industrial revolution was sort of this innovation push. I think we're kind of in that
Other cycle. So, uh, risk is, doesn't always have to be downside. It could be an upside case. So we're, we're kind of monitoring that space, uh, quite closely. So I was looking at the holdings as we've,
You've mentioned a few times, the big three, the portfolio is about 85% concentrated in those three deliberately. Um, talk us through why maybe not getting diversified a little bit downstream, because it seems like there's downstream opportunities to feed these three companies. Why the deliberates of like really that heavy conviction and concentration in those big three
Names? Uh, we started the portfolio giving, um, the, the, the, um, the portfolio name is actually memory select and select me is for us that the nomenclature is, uh, more constant concentrated positioning, uh, because we don't want the fund to be, uh, there are other strategies that, by the hyperscaler as well, because they're a consumer of memory. So we want to really focus on the S the sector of people who make the memory chips and those are, and because the top three companies, Micron, SK Hynings, and Samsung, uh, captures 90%, you will see a larger exposure. But I will say actually, as prices move and things become cheaper, we've actually moved into other names, for instance, SanDisk, which also makes another form of memory. And, and then this is
Actually the thing maybe also worth mentioning is that, um, there are many different types of memories. There's NAND memories, there's solid state. Um, there's also storage memory that I, Western digital and Seagate, I, there's a big thing in the 90, you go to Fry's and get like these two terabyte, um, uh, uh, uh, storage. All of these are being eaten up because all of these are different parts of the data center and, and AI infrastructure, um, built out. So what we felt was there was most pricing power in the top three, but as things become cheaper and as, market has pulled back, we we've actually seen some other cheaper names that we're actually also reallocating into. So we're very much an active management firm. So when there's opportunities,
We will, we'll actually go into those particular links. Interesting. So there are, as,
As the ETF space is proving itself to be anytime there's a hot thematic, you're going to get a bunch of ETFs coming into the space. So there are a few other memory ETFs on the market. You got DRAM, you got Tuddle, um, now yours, how is your approach different, uh, than maybe the other memory chips,
ETFs on the market? Yeah. So, uh, the, the first thing is we are more concentrated in the top, uh, HBM producers. That was our original goal. Uh, when we first launched it, um, SK Hyninks was not as accessible. They actually, uh, listed ADR, um, also in July, which makes it more accessible. However, what I would say is, um, we still prefer actually buying the Korean security instead of the ADR because the ADR is trading at 25, 30% premium to that of Korean. So we see some pricing differences. We actually add value, um, trying to ARP that a little bit. Uh, it's hard to ARP that, but there's some ways that you, you could do it. Um, and then, um, we have, we are one of the, I think,
Difference between us and a few other ETFs is that we can actually get the Korean denominated securities. Uh, and so, uh, some just focus on, uh, U S securities. Uh, some focuses on some Asian securities. One of the, I think difficulties is that Korean equity markets is actually highly regulated. It's largely open to institutional investors. You have to be registered to get those kinds of exposures. So we actually, it took us a while to launch it to actually get those access to get those securities when we think there's value. Uh, uh, and then we have also access to other parts of Asia's where a lot of the memory chip, um, ecosystem is. So I think what we want to do is not just pick the right names, but from an execution perspective, get them at a price that makes sense
For the portfolio. Well, while we have like an extra handful of minutes, I just would, I'd love a refresher on K triple Q's, um, which is your technology Titan select ETF. It's been your flagship now for a while. In the beginning of the episode, you talked about getting growth, with income. Can you just give everybody a refresher on what K triple Q does?
Yeah. The K triple Q is also, uh, has a select in the name. So what we try to do is try to get exposures to, uh, some of the most transformative and essentially mega cap, uh, technology companies in, in the world. Um, so this is the other end. It's, it actually, uh, contains some of the hyperscalers that I mentioned, like Google, uh, um, uh, Microsoft, NVIDIA, et cetera. Uh, but the idea is that if you look at historical returns, which, you have to assess whether that will repeat in the future is that they, these technology companies tend to have done very well because they had compounded 15 to 20% growth for not five years, not 10 years, but for 20 years. Right. And the reasons that they
Have done it done. So is because essentially they're monopolies, they, they dominate their particular verticals, and then they move to the next adjacent vertical to induce that growth. Because as a company gets larger, you expect the growth rate to slow down because they're part of larger part of the market. They can't grow more anymore. Right. Amazon dominate retail. They go to the next adjacent data, AWS, et cetera, et cetera. So what we wanted to try to do is to get this essentially growth premium momentum that exists in these particular names. And, uh, most of these names do not distribute dividends. So we wanted to use options to generate income. However, we were also trying to solve a third problem. Uh, this is our kind of tech focus is that most option income
Strategies underperform their underlying because, uh, you're giving up some of your upside to write option positions to generate the income, but we don't want to do that. We want to provide price appreciation and income. So two years down the line, I will say that we have kept up with the underlying and in fact outperformed it. And then it generates about 15 to 18% of, uh, distribution, depending on, where implied volatility is in the market. Uh, and also, um, it's not just, um, uh, in exposures to the hyperscalers is technology company. We define technology companies as those companies that have used technologies to transform their particular industry. So there were moments where we had Oracle, when they had the first, um, pop from, from the data center, um, uh,
Built out, um, Netflix when they were growing subscribers, less of this year. Uh, and we actually were able to move from the mega caps to semiconductors this year. That's actually what's kept the portfolio outperforming, uh, relative to actually almost all peers, uh, in the category. Uh, so when we first came on the channel two years ago, we were talking about, we look at momentum waiting because that's a characteristic of tech. And then we, um, the perfect time to do cover calls or call spreads is when the underlying is moving sideways or downwards and we'd be more tactical about it. So we've done kind of what we've talked about and that's actually proven out to have good total return as well as good, uh, income distribution.
Yeah. And I just, just to dive in that just a little bit deeper, one of the things that you do that's a differentiator to the other funds in the market, let's say like a jet Q is you're only writing calls on names with limited upside or momentum. You're not writing over the entire portfolio. So, um, why is that important? And how should an advisor who's listening to the show kind
Of understand that differentiation? Yeah. So, so one thing, one big difference, we, we, we write, uh, option positions on single names, uh, and then we have a basket of it versus if you write options on an index, you have a diversification first, then you have the option premium. So we think that actually first gives you more premiums that you can harvest. And then, um, to answer your question, um, we, we think it's important that you're selective in terms of when, um, uh, you write the options because not everything in the portfolio move in the same direction, right? So this year we've seen that Netflix has been falling, uh, ever since their announcement to try to acquire Warner brothers, but really, um, uh, I think, people are maybe valuing Netflix less as a technology
Company than a traditional company. So it's been falling, but this is actually the perfect time in which if you write, uh, call spreads or, you can clip the full coupon because the underlying never hits the strike, uh, but versus it would have been a very poor choice, uh, sorry, we, we do this with, with Microsoft, uh, this year, Google as well, because these, um, essentially have been falling this year, right? It would have been a very poor choice if we had written calls on semiconductor names like micron that's in the portfolio or AMD or et cetera, because you would have constantly capped your upside. So being able to work first and foremost, active managers. So we have to have an opinion on the underlying and, and then what, then it's the question of the
Implementation of those views, right? Uh, we can decrease the exposure for name by, uh, writing a call or, um, buying a put, et cetera. And so we want to, in the truest sense in active management, collect the premium where we can fully, uh, realize, uh, that implied volatility and then
Distribute it as income. Interesting. So how do you think about, between KMEM and K triple Qs, how do you see these fitting together in investor portfolio? Do they compliment one another? Should they look, be looked at individually? Like how would you utilize these in an already diversified model portfolio? Yeah. Uh, so I, I think a really nice place would,
Would be in an income portfolio. Uh, and, uh, most people for, for K triple Q, it's actually a compliment to other, uh, dividend equity ETFs. Uh, the reason we actually, it's, it's a good compliment is because typically dividend equity ETFs invest in high dividend paying names. Uh, and these are actually the slowest growing. Um, um, we're, we're actually going to release a paper about this. If you had just invested in dividend equity over the last three years, you would have gotten about 2% uh, more distribution than S&P 500, uh, S&P 500 distribution yields about 1%. Dividend equities about three, you get, a good pickup, but you would have lost out 20% in total return, right? Because most of the growth had been happening in, in, in tech, which is not what
Dividend equity portfolios invested. So now you can pair up dividend equity with K triple Q. You, the combined portfolio actually has no, gets closer to the sector weighting of S&P 500. And you get actually a 5% pickup, uh, from, from the combination of the two. So now it actually evens out your portfolio in terms of getting us large cap exposure. It's not just us large cap value. Now it's actually almost like us large cap value plus us large cap growth. You get the full sector, uh, in, in, in the exposure. So we think this could be a, uh, a core, a compliment. And then K mem, I will say is more of a specialized view. It's, it's thematic in nature and us large cap
Already has large part of technology, right? So this will be probably in part of your equity, a portfolio, but it would have to be coming out of your growth portfolio, uh, uh, allocation. Yeah.
So what's next Howard? we all, as an ETF issuer, we always have to be thinking about growing. Are you going to keep, um, are you thinking about keeping a very specialized view with these handful of ETFs and growing, or is there more that you guys have in the shop that we might see from you
Here, uh, in the future? We have a lot planned. Um, we, I mentioned we have income on precious metals, which, uh, it's, it's another bottle, uh, constraint people have in the portfolio management, but we're actually, uh, uh, hopefully we can come back and talk about, we have some portable alpha strategies that we used to run at the large firms. Now we've actually, uh, made it even more tax efficient. They're what we call double decker tax efficient. Um, and, and, and, and a lot of maybe just to say is that we're really focused on tax efficiency because, uh, us has a huge deficit and it's very hard to reduce costs. So the only way is to increase revenue. So we have a lot of strategies that are coming up that is very focused on giving
You the exposures that you need in a portfolio, but in a very, very tax efficient way. So that those are actually all coming out, uh, uh, in fact in the last week and in the coming months as well.
Interesting. Well, Howard, I always, I always learn something when we spend some time together. So I appreciate you being on before I can let you go. Where can people learn more about your ETFs and curve itself?
You can go to our website, which is curve invest.com K U R V I N V S T.com. And, uh, we not, don't just have, uh, um, fund information, but we also are pretty, um, publish our outlook and papers on how we think about these institutional institutional strategies. So, uh, please go
There for, for more information. Well, again, thanks again for spending some time with me. Thank you.
Thank you.
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